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TWO SCHOOL-FINANCE ROLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT:  PROMOTING EQUITY AND CHOICE 
STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal government could use its spending power to offset the inequal-
ities in expenditure on elementary and secondary school students that arise 
from the unequal fiscal capacities of states to deal with the educational bur-
dens they face.  For example, states that agreed to make a specified tax effort 
for education might be guaranteed federal assistance that, together with the 
state’s contribution, would fund a nationally-determined level of spending that 
takes into account both special student needs and the varying costs of educa-
tional services from place to place.  Moreover, the national government could 
tie its provision of financial assistance to the willingness of states to eliminate 
unfair inequalities in school spending within their borders. 
This scheme could eliminate the discriminatory treatment of our nation’s 
schoolchildren that has plagued public education from the outset.  Alas, the 
scale of the required federal role is probably too large in the present political 
climate. 
In the meantime, however, Congress might at least assure greater fairness 
to poor and disabled children by guaranteeing them access to a nationally-
established program of school scholarships. Where the family finds the educa-
tion offered by the local public school district to be insufficient, these scholar-
ships could be used to pay for education in other schools of the family’s 
choice. 
A. The Current Federal Role 
The federal government today plays a minor role in the financing of Amer-
ica’s public schools.  Indeed, up until 1965, there was very little federal role in 
our public education system and virtually no federal presence on the school 
finance side.  In that year, however, Congress enacted what immediately be-
 
          * Agnes Roddy Robb Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).  Eri-
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came and remains the largest federal program of aid to elementary and second-
ary education.1 
This scheme, widely referred to as “Title I,”2 enters the world of school fi-
nance in a special way—seeking to target financial assistance to poor children, 
or more precisely, to schools with concentrations of poor children.  Underlying 
Title I is the assumption that children from low income homes tend to be edu-
cationally disadvantaged and in need of extra educational attention, especially 
when their classmates are also disadvantaged.  This coming year Title I will 
provide approximately eight billion dollars.3 
The second most important type of federal aid to elementary and second-
ary education is for disabled children.  This funding is the result of legal and 
political battles that began in the 1970s, at a time when the public schools, in 
general, shamefully ignored the needs of disabled children—sometimes ex-
cluding them from schooling altogether, or else shunting them off into decid-
edly second class programs, or else admitting them to regular programs which 
simply ignored their special needs.4  The Congressional award of both proce-
dural and substantive rights to disabled school children was the outcome.5 
Children thought to be disabled are entitled to individualized assessment 
of their condition and creation and implementation of an individual education-
al plan (“IEP”) designed to deal with their special circumstances.6  In the up-
coming year, federal funding of special education will amount to about four 
billion dollars.7 
A civil rights mentality lies behind both of these programs.  The poor 
child, often African-American or Hispanic, and the disabled child were seen to 
share two important features.  First, they have special educational needs that 
require additional funding if they are to have a fair opportunity to be properly 
educated.  Second, rather than special treatment, the public schools had tended 
to ignore their needs, or worse, provide them with inferior educational experi-
 
 1. See Martin Orland & Stephanie Stullich, Financing Title I: Meeting the Twin Goals of 
Effective Resource Targeting and Beneficial Program Interventions, in IMPLEMENTING SCHOOL 
REFORM: PRACTICE AND POLICY IMPERATIVES (M. Wang & K. Wong eds., 1997). 
 2. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, § 2, 
79 Stat. 27 (1965). 
 3. Opening Statement on Federal Pre-K Through Twelve Education Programs, before the 
Senate Budget Committee Task Force on Education, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (statement of 
Bill Frist). 
 4. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1970) (amended 1997). 
 5. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 85 Stat. 
175 (1970) (revised by Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997)). 
 6. Lisa Applegate & Kathy Luthe, Montgomery Plan Based on Pupils’ Rights, ROANOKE 
TIMES AND WORLD NEWS, February 1, 1998, at A4. 
 7. Memorandum from Thomas Hehir, Director, Office of Special Education Programs to 
State Directors of Special Education (Feb. 26, 1998), available from U.S. Dept. of Ed., Ruth Ry-
der (202) 205-5547. 
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ences compared to those provided to non-disabled children of the middle class 
and the wealthy. 
Similar (if more extreme) failings by the states were earlier viewed as spe-
cial justifications for federal involvement, through the 1964 Civil Rights Act,8 
in helping to dismantle racially segregated public school systems that remained 
stubbornly in place even ten years after Brown v. Board of Education.9  In the 
same vein, poor and disabled were two more “discrete and insular minorities” 
in need of federal protection—and because of their special needs, additional 
financial assistance as well.  Schoolgirls, too, joined this list of protected 
groups through the Education Amendments of 1972, but as with racial minori-
ties, they essentially obtained an equal treatment guarantee without the provi-
sion of federal money.10 
Because poor and disabled children were not well treated by the states, 
when the federal government picked them out for special assistance, it was 
considered foolish merely to give the states lump sums, for instance, based on 
headcounts of those categories of students.  The fear was that the states, at 
worst, would either spend the money on already advantaged children or treat it 
as tax relief by diminishing their state contribution to education, or, at best, 
would add the money to their general education budgets in support of all stu-
dents more or less equally.  Because of this fear, these programs contain ear-
marking and tracing features designed to assure that the intended beneficiaries 
are the true beneficiaries.  For example, to insure that Title I funds generate 
extra spending on the target group, its rules require that districts start with at 
least comparable programs for Title I and non-Title I pupils, that Title I funds 
be used to supplement and not supplant services that would otherwise be 
available to Title I-eligible pupils, and that districts broadly maintain their 
non-federal spending.11 
All in all, federal financial assistance remains a very small share of total 
public spending for elementary and secondary education—about seven per-
cent, all federal school aid programs considered.12 
B. Problems with the Current Federal Role 
The existing level of federal aid, when combined with existing state and 
local school-finance practices, leaves the federal government in a very odd po-
sition.  In short, modest federal help is layered on top of a crazy quilt of other 
arrangements. 
 
 8. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964). 
 9. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 10. See generally 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (1972). 
 11. See Orland & Stullich, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
 12. Editorial: The President’s School Proposals,  WASH.  POST, Jan. 28, 1998, at A16. 
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It would be different if, for example, there were a national consensus as to 
what standard a good-quality education should include for the ordinary pupil 
and everywhere that is what the public schools provided.  Against that back-
drop, modest federal add-ons targeted to extraordinary students who need spe-
cial assistance might be easy to understand especially when, under this hypo-
thetical state of affairs, no schools were otherwise making special provision for 
such pupils.  But that is not at all the real state of affairs. 
Some schools, for example, receive federal money for their poor and disa-
bled pupils even though those schools already have available to them much 
more than the average amount of money available to similar schools.13  If poor 
and disabled children are ill-treated in such schools, it is not a matter of too lit-
tle money.  Rather, it is a matter of its distribution.  These pupils need a right 
to have school spending based on pupil needs more than they need extra cash 
for their schools. 
Moreover, much has changed since the 1970s and in many schools there is 
empathy for the poor and the disabled quite apart from federal involvement.  
Or, there may be empathy for these classes of  pupils at the state level, and that 
may have resulted in, say, special state compensatory aid programs for them.  
In either case, in at least some schools there is quite sufficient funding for the 
needy groups who would receive adequate special assistance in any event.  
Disabled and poor pupils attending those schools do not need federal involve-
ment. 
Other schools caring for these special students are generally strapped for 
resources. They would, in any event, voluntarily spend disproportionately on 
the poor and disabled among their pupils, but they can only spend relatively 
small sums on everyone.  In these schools more money across the board is 
what is needed.  Indeed, more money spent on the poor and disabled alone 
might not most benefit those groups; instead, they would be better served if the 
basic education provided to everyone were improved. 
As I will detail below, among the schools that are generally strapped for 
funds, often it is because their school’s district itself is just too poor and there 
is insufficient state aid to offset that poverty.  Sometimes the district is not so 
poor (or it is but the state will generously match the district’s effort) and yet 
the local voters just are not supportive of education in general.  In still other 
communities, the real problem is an inter-state one in the sense that the com-
munity’s state is relatively poor. 
Of course, there is yet another category of schools that is both short on 
money and indifferent or hostile to the poor and disabled.  Children in those 
schools need both more school-level funds and protection as to how they are 
spent.  The existing federal scheme is structured in effect as though all schools 
 
 13. Paul Goodsell, Special Needs Affect School-by-School Spending, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD, Jan. 21, 1997, at 1. 
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are like this—which they are not.  In sum, school-based financial problems (if 
any) that poor and disabled pupils face vary considerably, yet the federal strat-
egy has been uniform.14 
Moreover, this analysis has so far focused on poor and disabled students as 
though they are all the federal government should care about.  But, as will be 
detailed below, there are ordinary children on whom arguably too little money 
is spent who might also have a legitimate claim to federal assistance. 
Furthermore, federal aid to education is not financed with golden eggs.  
Instead, it must come from federal tax proceeds born by taxpayers in various 
states.  Since money raised is currently sent back to schools where poor and 
disabled children attend, one might initially think the scheme is re-distributive 
among the richer and poorer states.  But this is not entirely clear.  After all, 
states like California and New York are wealthy, but they also have a dispro-
portionate share of the nation’s poor and disabled within their borders.15  Put 
differently, to the extent that states like that receive federal aid moneys that 
their own taxpayers send to Washington, the impact of the program is not one 
of redistribution among states but rather of attempted earmarking within states 
of but a small share of total school spending.16 
There are additional problems with existing federal strategies.  First, on the 
Title I side, although the plan on its face seems to call for concentrating funds 
in schools with the highest concentrations of poor children, that is not the case.  
Instead, every district receives its share of Title I basic grants based upon its 
number of poor children—unless fewer than 2% of its children are poor (a rare 
situation in all but the wealthiest areas).17  Within districts money is concen-
trated in schools with the poorest children.18  But the upshot of that require-
ment is that poor urban schools often have no Title I money for their schools 
enrolling relatively fewer poor children, even if the proportion of poor children 
in those unserved schools is much higher than the proportion of poor children 
enrolled in suburban schools receiving Title I funds.19  In response to this 
awkward situation, some effort has been made to further concentrate Title I 
funds by restricting them “to counties and school districts with at least 6,500 
eligible children or more than 15% eligible children,” but so far Congress has 
been unwilling to designate very much of the Title I money in this way.20 
 
 14. Deborah Anderluh, High Turnover, Low Expectations Plague Poor Schools, 
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 25, 1997, at A1. 
 15. Pondering Immigration, THE PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Oct. 23, 1997, at B6. 
 16. Ken Foskett, Senate Republicans Block Grants a Centerpiece in GOP Education Plan, 
THE ATLANTA JOURNAL/THE ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, January 20, 1998, at A5. 
 17. See Orland & Stullich, supra note 1. 
 18. Mark Skertic, Schools Bracing for Staff Cuts Federal Money to be Disbursed More 
Broadly, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 17, 1997, at B1. 
 19. See Orland & Stullich, supra note 1, at 4, 11. 
 20. Id. at 5. 
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Second, the unhappy fact is that studies of the effectiveness of Title I fund-
ing raise considerable doubt as to whether the money truly accomplishes any-
thing in most places.21  This is not to assert that there are no exemplary pro-
grams.  But overall many doubt whether poor children learn more as a result of 
Title I.22  To date, schools find it much easier to create pull-out programs for 
low income pupils because that sort of spending is easily documented, even if 
in their judgment the low income pupils would actually benefit more from a 
scheme more difficult to document to the satisfaction of federal officials.23 
Some think that the pull-out strategy is disastrous because it removes the child 
from the regular teacher during the school day.  They would prefer using Title 
I for after-school or longer-school-year programs.24  Cynics may suggest that 
Title I’s primary impact is to provide jobs in public schools located in poor 
neighborhoods – although it is by no means clear that otherwise low income 
people from those communities are the main recipients of those jobs. 
Third, in the special education field, the major complaint at the moment 
seems to be that the federal rights created on behalf of the disabled are dramat-
ically under-funded by the federally provided funds.25  In the political talk of 
the day, this translates into an “unfunded mandate” and leads to what is some-
times called “encroachment.”26  Money that was envisioned as intended for the 
ordinary pupil must be siphoned off to help fund the special needs of the disa-
bled child. Were the disabled simply the hearing-impaired, visually-impaired, 
and mobility-impaired, encroachment might raise few hackles today.  Adding 
in the mentally retarded is a complicated matter: do we fear and detest them 
and find it wasteful to educate them (as was the conventional outlook) or do 
we now empathize with them and their parents and respond with a generous 
willingness to try to do something helpful for them even at higher than average 
cost? 
In any event, when it comes to other major classes of the disabled, there is 
considerable public resentment brewing.  The learning disabled comprise one 
group.  Many wonder whether this is a true disability or rather an excuse for 
what they imagine are mostly white middle class parents seeking extra funding 
for children who are not bright or who are not effectively socialized to work 
hard.  The other group is the emotionally disturbed.  They are often thought to 
 
 21. Id. at 14. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 8, 19. 
 24. 1994 amendments to Title I are designed to encourage such programs.  See Orland & 
Stullich, supra note 1, at 8; Other amendments are intended to permit some local officials to ex-
periment with school wide improvement projects that could benefit both Title I and other pupils.  
See Orland & Stullich, supra note 1, at 20. 
 25. Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L. 
REV. 1137, 1137 (1997). 
 26. Id. 
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be children who “act out” in class (often imagined to be primarily non-white 
boys) and are generally thought to be trouble-makers.  In short, they are seen 
by many to deserve disciplinary controls rather than special coddling.  What-
ever the truth of these surmises, it is easy to see why they contribute to a back-
lash against “encroachment,” i.e., less spending on “ordinary” children. 
It seems a propitious time, therefore, to explore afresh possible alternative 
federal roles in the financing of elementary and secondary education.  In order 
to provide the right context for re-evaluation, however, it is necessary to pro-
vide some details about the basic funding of public schools by states and local-
ities, as well as the legal challenges to those funding arrangements mounted 
during the past thirty years. 
II. TRADITIONAL LOCAL AND STATE SCHOOL-FINANCE ROLES AND THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES 
The American system of public education was largely created during the 
second half of the 19th century, at which time local government was the basic 
provider of public services.27  The dominant political image was that people in 
a local community would collectively support needed services—like public 
safety (police and fire), public utilities (such as water), roads, and so on. Public 
education was cast in this local-government tradition.  Although a specialized 
public entity (the school district) was often employed, it was widely under-
stood from the start that each community would create and fund its own 
schools, and, as with other local services, the funding mechanism would be 
imposition of  taxes on property located in the community.28 
If all (or at least most) local communities could be thought of as similar—
containing, say, some farmers, laborers, artisans, small merchants, successful 
business and professional people and so on—and so long as each school was 
understood as constituting a simple building and teacher for each grade, then a 
series of uncoordinated local actions could nonetheless cumulate to achieve a 
“system” of more or less “common schools” for young Americans everywhere 
(putting aside, of course, the widespread exclusion blacks and others from 
many so-called public schools!). 
If it was not clear at the outset, however, it was surely clear by the later 
part of the 19th century that public schools were not, and simply would not be, 
the same from place to place.29  First, some communities faced much greater 
 
 27. William E. Sparkman, Symposium: Issues in Education Law and Policy: The Legal 
Foundations of Public School Finance, 35 B.C. L. REV. 569, 578 (1994). 
 28. Id. at 579. 
 29. See generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101 (1995).  “In the courts, in state legislatures, in scholarly analysis, 
and in the popular press, discussions of education funding over the last several decades have fo-
cused on the glaring inequalities between rich and poor school systems . . . . ”  Id. at 102. 
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burdens than others and could not provide the same caliber of schools others 
established.30  For some, the burden was having a higher proportion of school 
age children to teach than others.31  For others, the burden was that the mem-
bers of the community were poor and did not have a strong commercial and 
industrial base to tax.32  Second, some communities seemed to care about edu-
cation more than others.  Early on, for example, they provided high schools, or 
encouraged more of their local pupils to attend them, and thereby paved the 
way for more of their students to attend institutions of higher learning.  Over 
time each of these differences increased. 
Public schools are different from other traditionally local services, howev-
er, because education has a prominent place in state constitutions.33  Perhaps 
because of these provisions, or perhaps simply because of widespread felt im-
portance of education, state legislatures eventually began to take on some re-
sponsibility.  Although until now, no state other than Hawaii has taken over 
public education34 and made it a truly state function, from the late 1800s states 
were significantly involved in public school financing. 
First came what may be called “basic” grants—the transfer to all school 
districts from the state treasury of $X per pupil.35  This amount was never real-
ly intended to be sufficient to completely pay for a child’s education; it was 
designed to provide encouragement to local school districts to copy the state’s 
example by putting up extra money needed to support local schools.36 
Of course, were there no strings attached to these basic grants, some dis-
tricts might simply reduce their existing effort in order to offset the grant, 
thereby converting state aid into a property tax rebate to the local community.  
Still, most school districts seemed instead to welcome state aid as a way to in-
crease spending on schools beyond what local people could afford on their 
own. 
 
 30. See generally ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF 
EQUAL EDUCATION OPPORTUNITY 126-133 (1968). 
 31. Id. at 129 (providing examples of disparate results in funding by comparing a district 
comprised mostly of industry with few pupils to another, largely residential, with many pupils). 
 32. WISE, supra note 30, at 126, quoting CHARLES S. BENSON, THE CHEERFUL PROSPECT: 
A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 44-45 (1965) (“[T]he power of some dis-
tricts to include . . . large industrial holdings within their boundaries . . . allows those districts to 
provide expensive educational programs at extremely low rates.”). 
 33. Enrich, supra note 29, at 105-106 (noting that nearly all state constitutions include an 
equal protection clause similar to that of the Federal Constitution and an “education clause” 
which obligates the state to establish a public school system). 
 34. Id. at 194. n.9. 
 35. CHARLES S. BENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 195 (1961) (describing 
the major funding approach at the turn of the century). 
 36. Id. at 196-7 (explaining that a main purpose of this funding approach was to provide in-
centive for districts to extend the scope of educational programs). 
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To be sure, basic state aid did not come from money that grew on trees; to 
some extent, local people were paying for this addition to the school budget in 
a different way.  But not completely.  In the first place, the state funding 
source tended not to be property taxes, and so it did not fall on district resi-
dents in the way the local property tax did.37  More importantly, communities 
received an equal amount per pupil through the grant regardless of how much 
the state tax raised in their community.38  In this way, the state aid could be 
considered re-distributive among communities. 
By the 1920s, however, a new approach came into vogue.39  Called the 
“foundation grant” (or the “foundation plan”),40 it remains, in important re-
spects, the cornerstone of public school finance today.  This approach is meant 
to be more re-distributive (or “equalizing”).41 
The idea underlying the foundation plan is that the state determines what 
basic public education costs (say, $5000 per pupil) and then makes local 
school districts the following offer: if you tax yourselves at X rate (say, $3 per 
$100 of assessed value of the property in your community), then we will give 
you what is needed beyond what you raise yourselves to pay for basic educa-
tion of all of your pupils.42  If school districts wish to spend more than the 
foundation level, they are free to do so by increasing their local taxes beyond 
the 3% rate used in this example.43 
It is easy to see the re-distributive (“equalizing”) nature of the foundation 
plan.  A community with relatively less property to tax would raise relatively 
less from its 3% tax rate, and hence it would receive relatively more from the 
state through the foundation grant.  So, too, a community with relatively more 
pupils to educate would receive a larger share of its basic education budget 
from the state.  Where a district stands with respect to a combination of these 
two factors is readily captured in a single measure—its assessed value per pu-
pil.  Simply put, under the foundation plan, those with lower assessed value 
per pupil obtain a larger share of their basic budget from the state. 
 
 37. BENSON, supra note 35, at 196-97. 
 38. Id. at 199-200.  Under this approach, the distribution of state aid depended on the num-
ber of teachers employed and “aggregate daily attendance.”  Id.  A reserve fund also existed for 
instances where distribution was inadequate to meet the needs of a particular district.  Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 202. 
 42. Id. at 203. 
 43. Id. at 242.  One of the main criticisms of the foundation plan formulation is that it does 
not recognize the differing income levels between districts.  While it establishes a minimum tax 
for achieving basic aid, it does not equalize the abilities of districts to exceed that rate.  See also 
JOHN E. COONS ET AL, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 106 (1970) (stating that the 
foundation plan does not “eliminate wealth determinants of quality except at the participation 
level”). 
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So, for example, if a district’s 3% tax raises $1,500 per pupil (i.e., 3% on 
$50,000 assessed value per pupil yields $1,500 per pupil), its foundation grant 
would be $3,500 per pupil, giving it $5,000 per pupil in total.  By contrast, if 
the 3% tax raises $4,500 per pupil in a district (i.e., 3% on $150,000 assessed 
value per pupil), its foundation grant would be only $500 per pupil. 
Were the foundation plan amount per pupil truly sufficient for a good edu-
cation so that few districts had any real interest in spending more than that, this 
grant-in-aid mechanism might have led to a statewide system in which (a) 
nearly all districts had nearly the same amount of funds per pupil to spend 
($5,000 in this example), (b) the residents of nearly all districts made about the 
same local “tax effort” for education (3% of assessed value in this example), 
and (c) the wealth disparities among the districts ($150,000 v. $50,000 as-
sessed value per pupil in this example) were largely evened out through the 
redistribution of statewide taxes through the foundation plan formula. 
However, in practice, none of this came about.  Although the foundation 
plan amount may have been “adequate” in some states at some times, by and 
large it has been well below what educators and school district officials gener-
ally have believed is needed to provide basic school services, let alone good 
quality services to which many communities aspired.44  As a result, for dec-
ades districts everywhere (or nearly so) would tax and spend well beyond the 
foundation amount.45 
A clear pattern resulted.  Communities with low wealth per pupil imposed 
relatively high rates of additional local taxes for public schools beyond the 
level required by the foundation plan, but from those high taxes raised only 
relatively little extra money to spend on their pupils.46  The districts with high 
assessed value per pupil tended to tax relatively little beyond that required un-
der the foundation plan, and yet raised from modest tax rates a great deal more 
money beyond the foundation amount.47  For example, an additional tax of 3% 
on an assessed value of only $20,000 per pupil would yield $600 per pupil, 
whereas an additional tax of only 1% on an assessed value of $200,000 per 
pupil would yield $2,000 per pupil.48 
 
 44. COONS ET AL., supra note 43,  at 68 (under the foundation plan, “[t]he states typically 
did not support the unit cost of even a basic education, let alone a substantial one”). 
 45. Id. at 65. 
 46. WISE, supra note 30, at 127 (discussing the inverse relationship between tax rate and 
yield under foundation plans). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Indeed, some very wealthy districts raised so much from the local tax required by foun-
dation plan that they didn’t qualify for any foundation aid at all.  Many states still guaranteed 
even these districts the original basic aid grant—i.e., a flat grant per pupil—thereby turning the 
basic aid grant into something that was highly regressive since it only benefitted the wealthy 
communities. 
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There were some exceptions to this pattern.  Wealthy areas (e..g, exclusive 
suburbs) whose residents were especially keen on public education had both 
high assessed value per pupil and high taxes—and in turn their schools were 
especially high spenders.  So, too, some property poor districts, perhaps de-
moralized by their poverty or perhaps ranking other local services equal with, 
or more important than, education did not impose upon their residents substan-
tial extra school taxes beyond those required by the foundation plan.  Nonethe-
less, the basic pattern noted above existed within states throughout the na-
tion.49 
This was the situation in the late 1960s when several critics began to ques-
tion whether America’s system of public school finance was legal.  Each of the 
critics called for states to take on a much larger “equalizing” role.50  Yet, crit-
ics cast their complaints in quite different ways.51 
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO WITHIN-STATE INEQUALITIES 
A first set of critics saw the problem simply as the dramatically unequal 
(average) spending per pupil from district to district around the state; that is, 
they objected to what might be called “geographic discrimination.”52  Their 
solution was to insist upon roughly equal spending per pupil statewide—one 
dollar/one scholar, as one prominent author put it,53 echoing the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s then recently-adopted one man/one vote standard in the legislative re-
apportionment area.54 
A second set of critics saw the problem as dramatic differences in wealth 
(as measured by assessed value per pupil) from district to district.55  Hence, 
they characterized the school-finance problem as one of  “wealth discrimina-
tion.”56  This second group did not mind if people in one community spent 
more per pupil on the education of their children, so long as that difference re-
flected their greater commitment to education as evidenced by a greater tax ef-
fort.57  In other words, they did not object per se to the tradition of local con-
trol; they found it unfair that most of the higher spending on public education 
 
 49. COONS ET AL., supra note 43, at 72. 
 50. Enrich, supra note 29, at 108-09.  The equal protection and education clauses of state 
constitutions have given rise to arguments against state funding systems since the 1960s.  Id.  The 
former focuses on equality of education and the latter, adequacy.  Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Harold W. Horowitz & Diana L. Neitring, Inequalities in Public Education and Public 
Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 787, 788 (1968). 
 53. WISE, supra note 30, at 155-56. 
 54. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-208 (1962) (upholding justiciability of a challenge to a 
Tennessee appointment statute on the basis of each citizen’s constitutional right to vote). 
 55. WISE,  supra note 30, at 129-30. 
 56. WISE, supra note 30, at 129-30. 
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was a result simply of much more local wealth (combined indeed with, on av-
erage, a lower tax effort).58 
Their solution was a system of “fiscal neutrality” that would be achieved 
by making all the districts equally wealthy.59  This might be accomplished, at 
least in part, either by redrawing district lines or by removing, say, commercial 
and industrial property from the local tax rolls and subjecting it to a statewide 
property tax that would be equitably distributed to the districts.60  But a differ-
ent solution was to gain the most attention—called “district power equaliz-
ing.”61  Through a new grant-in-aid formula, the state could constructively 
give each district effectively the same assessed value per pupil. 
Simply put, the district power equalizing formula would assure every dis-
trict that for every, say, 1% tax it imposed on local property, it would wind up 
with the same additional amount to spend per pupil as any other district.  The 
state would, in effect, match the shortfall (whatever its amount) at any level of 
taxation the district would select (at least within the permitted range of local 
taxing).  For example, assuring all districts $1,000 in spending per pupil for 
every 1% tax they imposed on their property treats all districts as having an 
assessed value of $100,000 per pupil.  If a district actually had only $20,000 
assessed value per pupil, the state would, in effect, match every $1 raised with 
$4 in state funds.  (As part of this plan, the state might well tell the local dis-
tricts that they would only be permitted to tax in the range of, say, 2-5%.)  No-
tice that if district power equalizing is to be truly equalizing in the way intend-
ed, districts that have more than the guaranteed level of  assessed value per 
pupil ($100,000 in this example) must not be allowed to retain all the funds 
raised.  This provision was termed “recapture.”  For example, if the district’s 
actual assessed valuation were $200,000 in this example, it would have to give 
over to the state half of the money it raised for schools (to be used by the state 
in providing aid to other districts). 
A third set of critics of the foundation plan centered their objection on the 
plan’s seeming assumption that all pupils are equal and its related assumption 
that an equivalent education “costs” the same everywhere in the state.62  
Whereas the first two groups of critics described above sought spending equal-
ity and wealth equality, respectively, this group pressed for a wider notion of 
opportunity or outcome equality—a sort of equality that inherently implied 
very different spending amounts per pupil.63  Whereas the existing system 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 207. 
 60. WISE, supra note 30, at 127. 
 61. COONS ET AL., supra note 43, at 202. 
 62. WISE, supra note 30, at 156. 
 63. See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff’d mem. sub 
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wound up providing extra money where the extra wealth per pupil was located, 
this set of critics wanted extra spending concentrated on communities (a) 
where education inputs (teacher salaries, maintenance and construction costs, 
and the like) were realistically higher and (b) where the pupils had greater ed-
ucational needs.64  In other words, they thought that higher spending per pupil 
was necessary for public education to have any chance of providing certain 
children with a realistically “equal education,” or what might more broadly be 
thought to be a genuinely equal educational opportunity.  These critics often 
had poor urban students in mind—pupils suffering from the double whammy 
of living in places where school costs were relatively high and often having 
higher-than-average educational needs, given the lower socio-economic status 
of their families.65 
Because all three groups of critics couched their complaints in legal terms, 
their common strategy was to involve courts in bringing about reforms.  Origi-
nally, the legal activists rested their claims on the U.S. Constitution and hoped 
for a nationwide victory in one stroke.66  But despite early victories by plain-
tiffs relying on the “wealth discrimination” theory both in the California Su-
preme Court and before a federal district court panel in Texas,67 these hopes 
were dashed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 1973 in San Antonio In-
dependent School District v. Rodriguez,68 in which the Court decisively reject-
ed the plaintiff’s legal claims, albeit by a 5-4 vote.69  That defeat did not end 
the legal battles, however.  Instead, it generated waves of litigation under state 
constitutions.70 
By now, the country has seen statewide school finance litigation brought 
in nearly every state.71  Courts in nineteen states have held traditional school 
finance arrangements (and sometimes the entire education system) to be inva-
lid under their respective state constitutions.72  In about half of these states, 
courts have adopted the wealth equalizing approach urged by the second set of 
critics described above.73  (These are usually called the “fiscal neutrality” or 
“equity” cases.)  Decisions in the other half have called for something ap-
 
 64. Id. at 331. 
 65. Id. at 336. 
 66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). 
 67. Id. at 18, 56. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 2-6. 
 70. See generally Paul Minorini & Stephen D. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the 
Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact and Future, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCE, ISSUES OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE (forthcoming 1998). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
92 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1 
proaching opportunity equality urged by the third set of critics.74  (These are 
usually called the “adequacy” cases.)  In practice, however, many of the legis-
lative remedies adopted in response to both legal approaches tend to move the 
state in the direction of spending equality (the goal of the first set of critics).75 
Courts in twenty-four states have rejected legal attacks on their school fi-
nance systems.76  These courts have largely concluded that educational ine-
qualities with respect to resources are not suitable matters for judicial interven-
tion.77  In as much as the language of state constitutions in these latter states is 
typically similar to language found in state constitutions of the former group of 
states, the differing outcomes appear importantly to reflect differing attitudes 
toward judicial activism and judicial restraint.78 
Meanwhile, litigation continues in several states and might spread to oth-
ers in others in the future.79  Indeed, at present, a number of  “adequacy” cases 
have been filed in states where “equity” and cases were earlier both successful-
ly and unsuccessfully litigated.80 
School finance reformers have by no means relied upon obtaining reform 
through courts alone.81  They have carried their critiques directly to legisla-
tures.82  However, without the courts backing, the reformers tend to run into 
traditional political alliances which for years protected the advantages of the 
wealthier districts.  Indeed, the opposition of these districts to reform can be-
come especially intense when, as illustrated above, the adoption of a wealth-
neutral district power equalizing plan would force them to cough up some lo-
cally raised property taxes to be shared with relatively poor sister and brother 
districts.83 
Moreover, despite initial court victories, in several states the legislature 
and governor have not altered the state school finance system in a way that 
meets court dictates (e.g., in Alabama).84  One indication of this foot-dragging 
is that the lawyers for the winning plaintiffs in several states have returned to 
court a number of  times (e.g., in New Jersey and Texas).85 
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The upshot is that, notwithstanding judicial and legislative reform efforts 
of the past thirty years, many believe in a large number of states significant un-
fair inequalities in the financing of public education remain.86 
IV. RETHINKING THE FEDERAL ROLE 
A. Inter-state Equity 
In the fight over inter-district inequalities, a wider point should not be ig-
nored.  There are enormous school finance inequalities from state to state.87  
This is obvious to anyone who looks, but is little-mentioned in a country 
where school finance has for so long been a local or, at best, a state and local 
responsibility.88 
At a simple level, there are marked average per-pupil spending differences 
from state to state.89  Indeed, these inequalities in the aggregate are larger than 
the aggregate of the inequalities within states.90  Some nationwide inequalities 
may properly reflect both cost differences from state to state as well as differ-
ences in the average needs of the pupils who happen to cluster in different 
states.  But it is clear that these national differences also reflect both signifi-
cant wealth differences among the states, as well as states’ differential com-
mitment to education.91 
These inequalities have not been the target of litigation, and it is difficult 
to see how they might be.  Nor have many policy reformers tried to attack 
them politically at the federal level.  Yet, one problem only the federal gov-
ernment can attack is inter-state inequalities in fiscal capacity. 
With respect to these, the three most attractive appeals individual states 
can make to Congress are a nation-wide replay of the within-state inequalities 
discussed earlier.  That is, (a) some states can argue that they are too poor to 
provide comparably good education; (b) some can argue that they have a dis-
proportionately large pupil load; and (c) others can argue that it is dispropor-
tionately expensive to educate the pupils they have (either because educational 
inputs are especially costly in their state and/or because their pupils are dis-
proportionately needy).  Of course, some states may make claims on more than 
one of these grounds. 
 
 86. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE 
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One measure of the first two appeals would be the assessed value of prop-
erty in the state per pupil.  The third appeal might then be incorporated into 
that preliminary measure, thereby creating a single index of state need.  For 
example, instead of  simply taking a pupil headcount,  a “weighted pupil” ap-
proach could be employed.  That is, pupils who cost more could be counted (or 
“weighted”) as more than one “average” pupil.  In this way, a state’s assessed 
value per weighted pupil would be a measure of its fiscal capacity to deal with 
its actual educational burdens. 
Readily imaginable federal approaches to the state-to-state differences re-
vealed by this measure of fiscal capacity are again reflected in the history of 
state financial aid to districts.  For example, the federal government could pro-
vide a basic aid grant to each state for every weighted pupil it has, perhaps in-
tending thereby to fund a basic education for every pupil in the country.  The 
latter, of course, would be fabulously expensive (although, if the federal gov-
ernment could employ the property tax for its purposes, the picture might look 
very different).  Realistically, therefore, a federal basic aid grant would proba-
bly be quite small, and, as with traditional state basic aid grants, would do very 
little to even out state-to-state inequalities in fiscal capacity. 
More could be achieved with much less federal funding if Congress creat-
ed a nation-wide foundation plan.  Each state would, in effect, be told that in 
order to participate it had to (or the state together with its districts as a group 
would have to) tax its property at X%.  If a state complied, then the federal 
government would assure that when federal funds were added to the proceeds 
of the state/local tax, the state would wind up with at least $Y per weighted 
pupil. 
As with state foundation plans,92 this approach would leave wealthier 
states more readily able to spend beyond the foundation level than could poor-
er states.  The question would then become how much federal interest there is 
in confronting this inequality.  Were the national interest strong enough, one 
strategy would be to forbid additional spending.  This solution would, of 
course, effectively nationalize the funding of public education—much as it is 
in a large number of nations around the world.  Obviously, it would be dramat-
ically at odds with our traditions. 
A different strategy would be the analogue of district power equalizing—
to be called, perhaps, state power equalizing.  This sort of financial mechanism 
could be readily constructed if there were no independent fund-raising at the 
district level.  Indeed, the way Medicaid is funded provides an example of 
sorts; under that program, the federal government matches each state’s spend-
ing on the poor at a rate that varies based on the wealth of the state.93 
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Creating a federally funded power equalizing scheme for education be-
comes much more complicated if the power to make different tax efforts is to 
remain at the district level, not the state level.  One way to deal with this com-
plication would be to push the states out of it: for example, the federal gov-
ernment could take over the state role (and perhaps as well the state tax 
sources normally used for education, like the sales tax) and make the power 
equalizing offer directly to the school districts. 
Several thorny problems would have to be solved before the federal gov-
ernment could actually attack the problem of differences in inter-state fiscal 
capacity.  One problem concerns how comparable assessed values of property 
are to be obtained.  At present, although all states assess property for their own 
purposes, they do not do it in a consistent manner.  Variations include which 
property is included, how the assessed value compares with market value, how 
often the assessments are updated, and what exceptions are allowed.  Even if 
Congress could try to specify the answers to these various issues, the states 
still would have an incentive to under-assess in order to make themselves look 
relatively poorer and hence entitled to more assistance.  This, in turn, might 
require considerable federal monitoring. 
One possible solution to this problem would be to measure the state’s 
wealth, not in terms of its property value, but instead, say, in terms of the in-
come of the people in the state (perhaps as reflected in census data, federal tax 
reports, and/or other data the federal government already collects).94  Indeed, 
some analysts would prefer this approach because they object to using stand-
ardized property values as the measure of relative fiscal capacity; in turn, a 
state’s property tax rate may not fairly measure its fiscal effort.95  (This com-
plaint may also be made at the state level of both district power equalizing and 
the foundation plan.)  Hence, for some analysts, shifting to a measure of fiscal 
capacity based on income might be not only easier, but preferable.  Under this 
approach, the amount of income in the state would be used as the numerator to 
set over a denominator comprised of the number of weighted pupils a state has.  
The resulting figure would be taken as the indicator of the state’s fiscal capaci-
ty to carry out the education function. 
A second important problem is deciding how to do the pupil weighting.  
Self-interest will cause different states to want to weight pupils in different 
ways.  Experts can play a role here, although some stubborn problems will re-
main. 
For example, on the cost adjustment side, exactly how will it be decided 
whether comparable educational inputs are more expensive in one state as 
compared with another?  Suppose we observe (hypothetically) that Mississippi 
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pays its teachers less than the national average.  Is this a reflection of the fact 
(hypothetically) that living costs and hence wage costs are truly less there?  
But what if it were the case that Mississippi has been willing to make do with 
less qualified teachers, and that is why it pays less?  Or what if it has had to 
make do with lower-paid teachers because it is too poor to pay more than it 
does?  This example suggests that there would be bitter battles over determin-
ing state-to-state educational cost differences—battles sure to be complicated 
by the fact that there are typically substantial within-state spending differences 
as well, some reflecting cost variations within the state.96 
As with the problem of measuring wealth differences, perhaps the problem 
of cost differences could also be solved by using an indirect measure—i.e., by 
finding a proxy for state educational cost differences.  For example, existing 
federal data sets such as those collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics,97 
already meant to measure variations in consumer living costs around the coun-
try, could be relied upon instead of trying to calculate state average education 
cost differences directly.  The federal Title I program now deals with this issue 
by treating higher and lower spending on education as though they measured 
higher and lower costs of education,98 but this ignores variation based on effort 
or taste. 
Even greater difficulties would probably confront the construction of that 
portion of the weighted pupil count that is based on pupil needs.  Suppose it is 
even roughly conceded that certain children “need” to have more money spent 
on them, so that they should count as more than a 1.0 student.  But how much 
extra weight should they be given?  With disabled children, over the past 20 
years the IEP methodology has been refined as school-based teams assess the 
special needs of disabled children and determine what special services are re-
quired to meet those needs.99  In some cases, the IEP will call for supplemen-
tary assistance (such as speech therapy, physical therapy, a sign language as-
sistant for the deaf, an assistant who reads to the blind or an aide who provides 
extra in-class or pull-out instruction).100  This approach goes along with the 
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general movement to “mainstream” disabled children with ordinary children as 
much as is feasible.  In other cases, fully substitute programs will be desired or 
required (self-contained classrooms, separate schools and the like). 
If we could agree upon what the proper plan elements are, then converting 
them to pupil weighting (e.g., 1.2 for those needing routine speech therapy, 4.0 
for the deaf, etc.) is not so difficult.  But the problem is deciding on the proper 
elements.  For example, on what basis is it to be decided whether, say, the stu-
dent needs speech therapy twice a week or four times a week, whether the 
pull-out instruction should be with four others or one-to-one,  whether the spe-
cial self-contained classrooms will have six students per teacher, or nine, or 
three? 
Professional norms have been created in the special education field, but on 
what basis?  A wide variety of standards are imaginable: what experts think is 
“reasonable,” what schools have felt they realistically can “afford,” what is 
“productive” in terms of significantly enhanced learning.  This search for 
standards may be approached in other ways as well.  Should the student re-
ceive what, on average, seems to be needed by a similar pupil to learn as much 
as a student without the disability?  But sometimes this will not be plausible 
regardless of how much is spent.  Should the goal, then, be to provide what is 
needed to make it reasonably likely that the student will achieve a minimum 
educational attainment?  Or what about a high minimum?  Or what about 
achieving up to that student’s potential, or at least most of the way?  This is 
surely a quagmire. 
Moreover, for educationally needy students who are not disabled, individ-
ualized assessment has not occurred.  What extras do low achieving children 
from low income families need?  Today’s “extras” for those children in most 
schools seem to be more a product of what federal Title I money turns out to 
be available than of an expert determination of what they really “need.” (And 
surely no one imagines that the funding level of Title I has been set to fully 
fund such needs.)  One approach would be to employ multi-variate regression 
analysis in hopes of discovering how much extra spending would be needed to 
reduce the achievement gap between the low income children and “average” 
children.101  But are we talking about cutting the gap in half or eliminating it 
entirely?  Moreover, does not basing these estimated on spending data drawn 
from today’s practices include wasteful, unproductive strategies that should be 
replaced? 
In the end, if the federal government is to go down this road, it is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that Congress will probably have to decide on the 
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weighting by making a rough guess broadly informed by a combination of ex-
pert thinking and a sense of fairness.  The upshot that non-English speakers 
might be assigned, say, a 1.75 weight (or perhaps 1.25 for limited-English 
speakers and 2.50 for non-English speakers), and this might, in turn, suggest 
that children from homes with income below the poverty level ought to receive 
a 1.40 weight, that substantially mentally disabled children should have a 2.0 
weight, and so on through a few more specially identified categories. 
There is at least one further challenge in the search for a single measure of 
a state’s fiscal capacity that should be addressed.  It is a frontal attack on the 
entire goal of using federal funds to reduce or eliminate these seeming inequal-
ities in fiscal capacity.  That is, some states might argue that their own state 
fiscal capacity is a function of the people working hard, building up the state 
economy, and so on.  This line of analysis implies that to bail out the poorer 
states with federal funds makes it seem that their lesser fiscal capacity is inevi-
table (say, reflecting the natural resources of the state), when that may not be 
the case.  These contentions begin to sound like a replay of those made during 
the recent welfare reform. 
Yet, from the viewpoint of the education of today’s children, this argument 
is hardly persuasive.  If they happen to live in a state that currently can afford 
to spend relatively little on education, they are innocently disadvantaged.  We 
could tell their parents to move; many people do indeed relocate for better ed-
ucational opportunities.  But for many children, the prospect that their family 
would move out of state in order to get away from their state’s present lower 
fiscal capacity is implausible. 
On the other hand, by contrast, it does seem much less appealing for states 
to argue to Washington that they need money because their own citizens are 
relatively uninterested in supporting education (independent of financial abil-
ity).  Nevertheless, it might be the case that the nation has an independent in-
terest in overriding this indifference.  Suppose, for example, it were reflected 
in truly inadequate schools throughout a state.  A well-designed national foun-
dation plan would assure an adequate effort in all states. 
Of course, reaching agreement on how to measure the states’ fiscal capaci-
ty solves only part of the problem.  Congress would then have to decide upon 
both the size of the national foundation plan (that is, how many dollars per 
weighted pupil) and the required state-level tax effort.  As a starting point, 
Congress might want to ask experts how much spending is needed for an “ad-
equate” education – perhaps defined as the sum required for most children to 
achieve reasonably high educational standards.102  Some experts have devel-
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oped an approach to “adequacy” that relies upon professional norms;103 others 
use a methodology that looks to spending levels in successful schools and dis-
tricts.104 
B. Intra-state Equity 
Suppose, then, that Congress were to create a nationwide foundation plan, 
but it would not cap education spending at the foundation level.  Suppose also 
that the federal government would not push states aside and deal directly with 
districts.  Leave open for the moment whether Congress would power equalize 
the states.  In either event, it would then have to decide how to deal with intra-
state inequalities. 
At one extreme, the federal government might determine a state’s aggre-
gate entitlement under a national foundation plan (or under a state power 
equalizing plan) and then give the money to the state to distribute however it 
wishes.  Under this approach, there would, for example, be no necessary re-
quirement that the state itself have a comparable foundation (or district power 
equalizing) plan in place for its own districts.  Indeed, under the “no strings 
attached” approach, a poor state could (subject only to state law limits) take its 
share of the federal funds and give them to wealthier students living in its own 
richest districts.  But the federal government is not likely to take such a hands 
off approach. 
Indeed, the federal government might condition its provision of state aid 
designed to reduce the impact of inter-state inequalities on a state having taken 
comparable steps within the state.  For example, a national foundation plan 
might realistically work like this.  The federal government would agree to pro-
vide the states the difference between, say, $5000 per weighted pupil and the 
amount raised if property throughout the state were taxed at, say, a 3% rate; 
note that $5,000 per weighted pupil might turn out to be something like $6,000 
per pupil headcount.  To receive its federal money, however, a state would be 
required to assure that spending in each of its districts is at least equal to the 
foundation level of spending per weighted pupil in each district. 
The simplest thing for a state to do under such an arrangement is to mimic 
the federal guarantee—requiring its districts to make the local tax rate envi-
sioned by the national foundation plan and then using the federal aid exclu-
sively to fill in the foundation amount.  At that point, any state education funds 
raised (as well as additional local funds) could be employed to supplement the 
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federal guarantee.105 (The federal government might also require that some or 
all of any extra school spending within the state were power equalized.) 
Note that the weighted pupil approach has built into it the extra money 
thought necessary for the proper education of those pupils who get the extra 
weighting, such as the poor and the disabled.  Although the national founda-
tion plan as thus far described does not guarantee that money actually be spent 
within the district on such pupils, the federal government might also insist on 
that as a further condition of participation in the federal scheme. 
C. Who Would Benefit From a National Weighted-Pupil Foundation Plan with 
Equalizing Strings Attached? 
Assume that Congress adopted a national foundation plan (or a federally 
funded state power equalizing plan) containing conditions requiring states to 
eliminate the inequities of their school finance systems.  Assume further for 
the moment that this plan substitutes for existing federal spending on the poor 
and the disabled. 
First, which states would get more money?  Under the new approach, a 
state would receive a disproportionate share of the federal pie to the extent that 
(a) its assessed value (or other wealth measure) per pupil headcount is relative-
ly low; (b) its educational costs are relatively high; and (c) its special-needs 
population is relatively large.  By contrast, under the current approach states 
receive extra money primarily based on the relative size of their special-needs 
population (c above) (with additional adjustments in Title I based upon school 
spending differences taken as a measure of school cost differences).106 
This means, for example, that assuming (hypothetically) a state like Min-
nesota scored relatively high on the first criterion (its assessed value per pupil), 
about average on the second criterion (its educational costs), and relatively low 
on the third criterion (its share of special needs pupils), it should expect to ob-
tain even less than the limited federal funding it obtains today.  Indeed, it may 
receive none.  By contrast, assuming that Arkansas (hypothetically) has rela-
tively low assessed value per pupil with about average costs and needs, it 
could anticipate increased federal funding.  New York (hypothetically) might 
lose federal funds because of its greater-than-average wealth per pupil, but it 
might gain funds because of its higher-than-average costs (depending on the 
size of the cost adjustment in the new plan as compared with the existing Title 
I adjustment); exactly where it would wind up today would depend on the de-
tails of the formula. 
 
 105. The state could comply with the federal conditions in other ways too, for example, by 
imposing a combination of state and local taxes up to the required rate and then distributing the 
federal and state funds to the districts to fund the foundation plan level. 
 106. See 20 U.S.C. § 1419 (1997). 
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Second, it is important to re-emphasize that under the hypothetical plan, 
any state receiving funds would have to assure that, within its borders, money 
was fairly spent in its poorer districts (measured by low wealth and high costs) 
and, perhaps, on its special-needs pupils.  Hence, for many states, the federal 
funding would be accompanied by a substantial reshuffling of state and local 
money.  It would be incorrect simply to assume that, as compared with the pre-
sent approach, the adoption of a federal, weighted-pupil foundation plan would 
shift funds, say, from low income children in Detroit to Oklahoma City subur-
banites. 
Of course, as a matter of political reality, federal legislators would want to 
know approximately how their constituents will fare, and they would have 
their staffs scrutinize alternative approaches to pupil weighting and wealth 
measurement to see if they made a difference. 
Plainly, a national foundation plan could carry vastly differing price tags 
depending upon the combination of (a) the dollar level of the per-weighted-
pupil guarantee and (b) the required state-local tax rate.  Put differently, for the 
same amount of federal funding, the foundation level could be pushed higher 
or lower depending upon the participating tax rate.  Although the attractive-
ness of a higher (truly “adequate”) foundation guarantee may, in turn, lead to 
pressure for a higher participating tax rate, it is also easy to see that changes in 
this direction tend to make more and more states able to raise the full amount 
of the foundation guarantee from their participating tax rate and hence cease to 
qualify for federal assistance.  This tweaking of the plan may be attractive to 
many because it more clearly targets federal aid on the states with the least fis-
cal capacity to deal with their educational burdens.  Yet, as states become “no 
aid” states, this also may sharply undercut the ability of the federal govern-
ment to press for the elimination of intra-state inequalities in those states, to 
say nothing of altogether losing political support for the plan from the “no aid” 
states.  Realistically, then, a national foundation plan that would have a signif-
icant impact would almost surely be far more costly than the sum of existing 
federal efforts (and would make the calculation of winners and losers more 
complicated). 
D. Federal Efforts to Date 
To date, federal efforts to promote inter-state and intra-state equity have 
been far more limited than the proposal under discussion here.  In 1994, Con-
gress authorized a revision in Title I that would reward with extra funds those 
states that have done more within-state equalization, but this provision has yet 
to be funded.107  At that time some argued that Title I’s “comparability” re-
quirement should be applied to all schools in the state, not merely those within 
 
 107. See Orland & Stullich, supra note 1, at 4 (noting that the Education Finance Incentive 
Program, created in the 1994 reauthorization of Title I, has not been appropriated funding). 
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the school district, thereby making intra-state equalization a condition of re-
ceiving Title I funds.108  But this was rejected.109  If nothing else, the limited 
size of Title I may make this seem like the tail wagging the dog.  Neither of 
these reforms attack inter-state inequalities. 
Major political problems which have stood in the way of a stronger federal 
role in promoting equity are, on one hand, the perceived lack of money at the 
federal level that might be used to help achieve both within-state and between-
state equalization and, on the other hand, the strong resistance to unfunded 
mandates, which is what federal commands to achieve intra-state equity are 
seen to be when they are not backed up with cash.110  More generally, state 
representatives in Congress have simply been unwilling to use federal power 
to try to “solve” the intra-state inequality problem, and the representatives 
from states with greater fiscal capacity have been unwilling to support 
measures broadly aimed at “solving” the inter-state inequality problem. 
President Clinton’s latest proposal for an enhanced federal role contains 
the same flaw as existing federal programs.  The President wants to increase 
the amount of federal aid to education by giving schools money to lower their 
class size.111  Assuming that sharply reduced class size yields higher achieve-
ment, re-ordering spending patterns in this way is not an idea that the Admin-
istration dreamed up.  Some states have already adopted programs to do just 
what the President proposes.112  They don’t need federal funding to bring 
about this reform.  Other states are moving in this direction on their own, or 
certainly could do so if they wished.  Money per se is not their problem; for 
them it is a matter of deciding upon their spending priorities, something that 
has long been left to states and localities.  For some states, however, it is simp-
ly financially too burdensome to lower class size a lot.  A generous national 
 
 108. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14155, S14169 (1994) (statement of Senator Mitchell). 
 109. Interview with Jack Jennings, former General Counsel to House Education and Labor 
Committee in Washington, D.C.  (Nov. 11, 1997). 
 110. In view of recent United States Supreme Court cases, it is by no means clear that Con-
gress could simply order states to make their school finance systems more equitable.  See U.S. v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997); Swanner 
v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 513 U.S. 979 (1994).  Indeed, unless the thinking behind 
those cases is to be rendered irrelevant, the Court will have to apply some federalism limits to the 
spending power as well, thereby creating some limits on what the Congress can impose on states 
as conditions on receiving federal funds.  Nonetheless, does not seem to me likely that there 
would be anything legally objectionable about requiring states to enact a comparable state foun-
dation plan as a condition of participating in a national foundation plan. 
 111. See Anemona Hartocollis, Educators Say Clinton’s Plan On Class Size Faces Problems, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1998, at A1. 
 112. See, e.g., Nanette Asimov, State Figures Reveal Early Success of Plan To Reduce Class 
Size, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Feb. 6, 1998, at A19; Jennifer Peebles, Schools Get Brief Re-
lief in Meeting State Guidelines, THE TENNESSEAN, March 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 
7399157 (noting Tennessee law mandating low pupil-teacher ratios). 
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foundation plan of the sort proposed here would more efficiently direct federal 
funds towards this need. 
Republicans have been pushing to allow state and local educational au-
thorities to take their federal funds as block grants.113  This would give schools 
and districts great leeway to spend the funds as they wish.  Yet, it is by no 
means clear that it makes sense from a policy perspective to use, say, the Title 
I funding formula to distribute what amounts to general federal aid to educa-
tion.  Perhaps this approach, which is unlikely to become federal law, should 
be viewed as a preliminary step towards the embrace of a federal school fi-
nance role of the sort described here. 
E. School Choice 
Suppose that no significant amount of new federal funding is to be made 
available to the states.  Does this leave any room for an innovative school-
finance role for the federal government? 
As indicated earlier, if the state and the local district together provide what 
a family considers to be too few resources in the school to which its children 
are assigned, the family might consider moving to another district or to another 
state (or if it is wealthy enough, it might withdraw its children from public 
school and pay for their education in private schools).  Of course, moving can 
be very costly, especially if the parents work nearby and the family friends and 
relations live nearby, but schools with the sort of spending the family wants 
for its children are not.  Moreover, poor families might find it financially im-
plausible to move into a community that has the spending level it desired. 
So, instead of forcing families who are dissatisfied with their local public 
schools to move, families might instead be enabled to stay but send their chil-
dren to other schools.  By severing the existing tight connection between place 
of residence and the child’s school, at least some of the school-finance ine-
qualities earlier discussed might be eliminated. 
If we start out imagining that a large share of families would, if given the 
chance, choose other than their local public schools, then it might no longer 
make sense to continue today’s basic school funding arrangements.  A local 
school district could still run schools (i.e., make them available to anyone who 
wished to attend), but the idea underlying conventional school finance—that 
 
 113. On April 23, 1998, Senate Republicans successfully added the block grant scheme as an 
amendment to H.R. 2646, a House-passed bill that would give parents federal tax breaks for edu-
cational spending.  The “educational savings account” feature alone dooms this bill to a presiden-
tial veto.  See, Lizette Alvarez, “Senators Endorse Tax Breaks for Education Savings Accounts, 
NEW YORK TIMES, April 24, 1998, Sec. A, page 1, col. 1.  For background on the federal block 
grant approach, see Wayne Riddle, Educational and Public Welfare Division, Congressional Re-
search Service, “Education Block Grants:  Option, Issues, and Current Legislation” (updated May 
29, 1996). 
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the families in the community are getting together to fund those schools—
would be highly inapt.  Thinking big like this suggests that, instead of the con-
ventional arrangements described earlier, perhaps the state would provide eve-
ry child with a scholarship to be used to pay for schooling wherever the child 
enrolled. 
Under this state scholarship approach, it might be best to think of all pub-
lic schools as “charter schools.”  This label that has been adopted by the grow-
ing “charter school movement” that has taken hold in a large number of 
states.114  Put simply, charter schools are independent public schools that are 
organized and operated at the school level under a charter that has been 
awarded by either the local school district or some other public body.115  Char-
ter schools do not generally base their enrollment on where pupils live; indeed, 
most accept students on a first-come first-served basis.116  And, charter schools 
are generally funded, analogously to the scholarship idea, on a per-student ba-
sis; i.e., so many dollars for every pupil they enroll.117 
Non-public schools could also participate in a similar scholarship plan.  
Let us assume they would be allowed to do so.  This is not, however, the place 
to go into all the difficult policy and legal issues surrounding their inclusion 
(especially religious schools).  It is perhaps enough merely to point by analogy 
to the ability of Americans to use publicly funded scholarships to attend insti-
tutions of higher education and to make use of public subsidies in support of 
privately run pre-schools—to say nothing of the wider analogy of spending 
public funds through Medicaid and Medicare to pay for private medical care or 
of similar programs that help people obtain private housing. 
If we think of the state scholarship plan as analogous to the national foun-
dation plan described above, the ordinary child would obtain a scholarship set 
at the foundation level amount, adjusted for living costs in the region in which 
the family lives.  In addition, adjustments that would go into the need side of 
the weighted-pupil approach could also be carried over to be applied to the 
scholarship amount.  For example, a limited-English-speaking child’s scholar-
ship (other things equal) might be worth 125% of the basic amount in the area 
in which she lives, a deaf child’s 400%, and so on.118 
 
 114. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 18A:36A-4 (1997); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (1997); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. § 15-183 (1997). 
 115. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, A STUDY OF CHARTER SCHOOLS: FIRST YEAR 
REPORT (1997) (available on-line at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/charter/index.html). 
 116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 14.03.265 (1997). 
 117. At present, many charter schools get their funding from the local school district where 
they are located and this works tolerably well so long as most of the children come from the same 
district.  But as this changes, complicated patchwork arrangements are needed that ultimately will 
undermine the suitability of local-based funding. 
 118. Under this regime it might well not be necessary for government to insist that any school 
in which such a pupil enrolled actually spent the weighted amount extra on that pupil.  Instead, 
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Suppose, however, a family wanted more spent on its child than the foun-
dation level scholarship provided; i.e., to enroll its child in a school whose tui-
tion charges were in excess of the basic scholarship amount.  One response, 
analogous to the implicit response of the foundation plan, would be to tell fam-
ilies to add on to the scholarship out of their own income.  This, of course, 
would make it easy for the wealthier families to outspend the poorer ones, per-
haps thereby gaining exclusive access to the priciest schools that, among other 
things, bid away many of the best teachers.  This, of course, is exactly what 
well-to-do families in most states are already able to do by banding together in 
high cost suburbs and sending their children to high spending public schools. 
If this is thought unfair, one response would be to forbid the use of the 
scholarships at schools that seek tuition payments beyond the scholarship 
amount.  Indeed this has been the general practice with charter schools.119  But 
that is not the only solution. 
Government could alternatively adopt a power equalizing strategy, here 
called “family power equalizing.”120  Simply put, based upon its income, a 
family would have to contribute a share of the extra tuition charged at the 
school it selected.  But through the grant-in-aid formula, all families would be 
made roughly equally able to “afford” the more expensive schools if that was 
what they wanted (and were willing partially to pay for). 
In sum, if a state funded basic scholarships for everyone, adjusted their 
value based upon the weighted-pupil factors, and subsidized supplemental 
scholarships in a power equalizing manner, then concerns about within-state 
school finance inequalities discussed above would be eliminated. 
The main problem remaining would be the states’ differential fiscal ability 
to fund their programs.  Hence, as discussed above, reducing those inequalities 
could be an important federal function even in a choice scheme. 
To deal with this problem, the federal government could itself simply take 
over full funding of the scholarships.  But this is so far from our traditions and 
would be so expensive as to make it highly implausible for the foreseeable fu-
ture.  Indeed, at the present time, even a sweeping statewide scholarship pro-
gram of the sort discussed above also seems politically implausible (although 
perhaps a bit less so). 
A less sweeping version is at least imaginable.  So, assume now, contrary 
to what was assumed before, that the scholarship program would be limited, 
                                                                                                                                      
perhaps we could simply rely upon the parents choice to assure that their child received its fair 
share of the chosen school’s resources. 
 119. Debra Banks & Eric Hirsch, National Institute on Educational Governance, Office of 
Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Dept. of Education, The Charter School Roadmap 
3 (1997). 
 120. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman & John E. Coons, Federal Scholarships for Private El-
ementary and Secondary Education in PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THAT PUBLIC GOOD: POLICY 
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 115 (Edward M. Gaffney, Jr. ed., 1981). 
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and that most families would stay put, keeping their children in the local pub-
lic schools of the district in which they wind up living.  This assumption per-
mits keeping school districts in place as both revenue raisers and operators of 
schools (and, alas, as continued sources of school-finance inequalities).  The 
focus instead would be on a relatively modest percentage of families who 
would exercise their choice to enroll their children elsewhere. 
The government’s financial role would be to assure that those families re-
ceived the fair amount of economic backing in support of their exercise of 
choice.  Pupils attending in high cost areas would appeal for extra support, as 
would those whose children have special needs.  Indeed, if the family wished 
its children attend a more expensive school, it too might appeal for extra assis-
tance based upon its limited wealth (and hence its own inability to fund that 
extra spending). 
F. School Choice for the Objects of Federal Assistance 
In fact, the easiest way to imagine a choice scheme functioning on a mod-
est scale is to assume that it would be restricted exclusively to those families 
whose children count as more than 1.0 weighted-pupil in the regimes dis-
cussed above.  In the main, these would be poor and disabled children.  More-
over, thinking about it in this way allows us to re-conceive what is an appro-
priate federal role. 
Suppose the federal government undertakes to assure that the family of 
every disabled and poor child who is dissatisfied with what the local public 
schools offer under today’s regime can obtain a suitable scholarship that would 
enable the child to attend elsewhere.121  The scholarship here would be based 
on a Congressional determination of a reasonable national foundation plan 
amount, adjusted both for educational cost variations from place to place and 
the special needs of the poor and disabled.122 
For the disabled, this approach is not difficult to play out because it is but 
a variation on what is currently provided.  Today, the IEP is supposed to iden-
tify what services are needed for these children, and the district has an obliga-
tion to provide them.123  However, under the current scheme, the public 
schools generally offer to provide those services in-kind through programs—
that is, the schools actually provide what the IEP calls for.  If the parents do 
 
 121. This would put some pressure on the schools to do better by these pupils by adopting 
more effective programs.  Otherwise, they would lose those pupils and the funding they repre-
sent.  Admittedly, some schools would not be sorry to see some of these pupils go, but schools 
that feel this way are not likely to be especially good places for these children anyway. 
 122. It might also possibly be power equalized for families seeking to spend more than the 
base level provided. 
 123. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1997); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (Consol. 1997); MONTANA 
CODE ANN. § 20-7-411 (1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1997] SCHOOL FINANCE ROLES FOR  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 107 
not like the IEP proposal, they can contest its appropriateness in a hearing and, 
if successful, they may gain either additional services or the right to send their 
child to a different school (typically a private school) whose tuition the school 
district must pay.124 
Put simply, under the scholarship plan parents would not need to ask for a 
hearing and then win in order to obtain something they prefer for their child.  
They would simply be entitled to the value of their child’s IEP on demand, and 
they could take that sum in the form of a scholarship to be used anywhere else 
that satisfies them.125 
For the children of the poor, a larger change would be required.  But its 
outlines too are easily understood.  If low income families with Title I-eligible 
children were not satisfied with the program their local school provided, they 
too would have a right to a scholarship elsewhere. 
One way to think about this is that the school district would receive its 
federal Title I money as it does now, but if the family wants out, it would get a 
scholarship equal to a cost-and-need-adjusted national foundation level 
amount.  The federal government need not fully fund these scholarships.  Ra-
ther, it could simply insist that, as a condition of accepting federal money for 
the poor, states must to guarantee scholarships of the sort described.  However, 
for poor children living in states with low fiscal capacity, the federal govern-
ment might want to provide additional funds to bridge the difference between, 
say, the Congressionally determined national foundation level and the amount 
the state would raise per pupil were it to make a tax effort at the national aver-
age.  Such an approach would assure that poor and disabled children who ac-
cept the scholarships would receive financial support that reflects their own 
extra needs. 
In sum, I have endeavored to show that there is a potential role for the fed-
eral government to promote school choice in the name of school finance equi-
ty.126  Recent proposals to involve the federal government in school choice 
plans have been somewhat differently conceived.  A few years ago, for exam-
ple, Senator Hatch suggested a federally-funded national experiment with 
choice.127  Then presidential candidate Bob Dole proposed a modest school 
 
 124. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402 (Consol. 1997); see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1412 
(1997). 
 125. I do not mean that this scholarship right would necessarily substitute for the IEP hearing 
process if, say the parents want more from their local district; at a minimum, the scholarship 
would be an alternative to the hearing process. 
 126. Because the politically powerful teacher’s unions have had a veto power over in most 
states over efforts to introduce choice-based school reforms, some would see that as an additional 
justification for the federal government taking action on this front. 
 127. See, e.g., S. 1141, 102nd Cong. §§ 501, 511-13, 521-26, 532-36 (1991). 
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voucher scheme.128  Most recently, Republican leaders pushed to give school 
vouchers to low income families in the District of Columbia.129  Still, these 
proposals draw on the same general sentiment expressed above.  All too often, 
children from poor families and disabled children are served least well by to-
day’s public schools.  By allowing them to escape on fair terms from the 
schools offered them by today’s school finance system, we may provide them 
the most promising route to a better future. 
 
 128. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Dole Backs School Choice Through Vouchers, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 1996, at A4. 
 129. See Janelle Carter, Voucher Debate Renewed for D.C., THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
POLITICAL SERVICE, March 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7394699. 
